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Abstract 
 
This paper has two purposes.  In the first instance, it is an event study which sets out 
to determine whether or not a dividend signal can be detected, given that earnings and 
dividends are announced jointly by publicly listed New Zealand companies.  The 
second purpose is much more important.  In place of the usual simple OLS procedure 
known as the Market Model to estimate risk-adusted expected returns (and from 
these, abnormal returns), this paper contributes to event study literature by employing 
a friction model in which the values of relevant parameters are determined by a 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure.  This friction modelling approach is more 
robust than the Market Model when an event study is run on company returns data in 
the context of a thinly-traded market as it is not immediately reliant on the 
assumptions underlying the employability of OLS regression.  In addition, given that 
traditionally a piggy-back procedure involving restricted least squares regresssion has 
been used by past researchers to sort out the confounding effects of simultaneous 
dividends and earnings disclosures, this paper further contributes to event study 
literature and dividend signalling literature by positing several friction models which 
effectively achieves this same disentanglement.  The models in this study are not 
necessarily restricted to investigations of dividends and earnings, but are employable 
(with appropriate specifications of variables) to event studies in general. 
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1 Introduction 
This study sets out to provide an alternative methodolgy for investigating the impact 
of announcements (and simultaneous announcement combinations) on share prices in 
the context of a market in which many shares are not traded every day the market is 
open.  This methodology is known as friction modelling and employs maximum 
likelihood estimation in place of the more traditional use of OLS regression.  The 
advantage of using a friction model is that it specifically treats, as a separate category, 
zero-value daily returns (which are often associated with failures to trade — a 
phenomenon often called thin trading).  In data sets from thinly-traded markets, zero-
value returns are very common.  The friction model methodology proposed here is 
demonstrated in terms of a search for evidence of dividend signalling from New 
Zealand’s thinly-traded share market, which has an extra level of complexity added to 
it by the fact that dividend and earnings disclosures are usually bundled 
simultaneously in a single announcement.  However, the important contribution this 
paper makes to the literature is that the model has the potential to be employed much 
more broadly in event study research than in just this one narrow area that concerns 
dividends. 
But given that this study employs the methodology with respect to dividend 
signalling, a short review of relevant dividend signalling literature is needed.  In 
addition, some commentary will also be furnished on research into correcting for the 
effects of thin trading. 
Research has now been going on for 45 years as to whether the announcement of a 
change in dividend sends a signal to investors after the concept was considered by 
Miller and Modigliani (1961).  Much of this was in the form of event studies 
employing the Market Model and focussed on price changes associated with 
American dividend announcements. But, in the United Kingdom, Australia and in 
New Zealand, dividends and earnings were and are announced simultaneously. This 
necessitated a methodology for separating out dividend-related effects from earnings-
related effects.  Kane Lee and Marcus (1984), working with near- (but not exactly 
simultaneous) US data, pioneered this methodology, which entailed running a 
restricted least regression on their event-window cumulative abnormal returns with 
seven regressor variables.  These were percentage dividend change, percentage 
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earnings change in (the two first-order variables), and five dummies to capture the 
interaction effects of the six economically plausible pairs of dividend and earnings 
direction-change (known as interaction variables).  This restricted least squares 
methodology, piggy-backing on an initial Market Model regression run was employed 
by Easton (1991) on Australian data, Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996) on 
British data, and Anderson (2006) on New Zealand data. 
However, the Market Model simply pertains to the running of an OLS regression on a 
time series to formulate daily expected returns, and from these, abnormal returns and 
cumlative abnormal returns.  In the presence of thin (i.e., periods of total absence of) 
trading in a particular share, the Market Model will produce outputs that bias expected 
returns downwards and therefore bias the resulting abnormal returns upwards — 
thereby exaggerating them.  Scholes and Willams (1977) addressed a less extreme 
form of the same econometric problem, known as non-synchronous trading, which 
entailed failures to trade precisely at the close of each period.  They were followed by 
a number of papers, which like Scholes and Williams, performed analyses and 
proposed adjustment mechanisms which did not entail moving away from reliance on 
on the underlying assumptions of OLS regression (Dimson (1979), Fowler, Rorke and 
Jog (1979), Dimson and Marsh (1979) and Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz and 
Whitcombe (1983), Fowler, Rorke and Jog (1979).  However, it was a moot point as 
to whether any of these studies offered any improvement on the flawed usage of the 
simple Market Model.  Berglund, Liljeblom and Loflund (1989) on Finnish data, and 
Barthody and Riding (1994) on New Zealand data, tested the performance of a range 
of these mechanisms against that of a simple employment of OLS and found OLS to 
be superior. 
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2, the concept of a friction 
model is explained in broad terms, and I review the literature in economics and in 
finance in which friction models have been used.  In Section 3, the current study’s 
data and variables are explained, while Section 4 goes on to disclose the fine details of 
the methodology.  The study’s results are then tabled under various subheadings in 
Section 5. 
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2 Review of Friction Models and their Literature 
Friction models are based on the concept that the a dependent variable, while 
monotonically changing in response to the behaviour of independent variables over 
most of their joint ranges, does not change at all over some bounded range in which 
the values of the independent variables are small. 
The insensitivity of a dependent variable to small changes in the state of relevant 
independent variables has been called ‘friction’ in economics jargon for well over half 
a century. The usage was cited as being traditional by Rosett (1959), when he 
presented the first friction model, and, indeed, coined the term ‘friction model’ to 
describe it. He provided a succinct description of what the model does with respect to 
the embedded employment of the statistical methodology of maximum likelihood 
estimation1: 
The maximum likelihood method for estimating relationships with limited 
dependent variables is generalized to include relationships in which the dependent 
variable, over some finite range, is not related to the independent variables. 
Effectively, the value of a given dependent variable changes in response to changes in 
value of a particular independent variable over most of its range, but not all of it. Over 
the finite range Rosett was referring to, the pressures for change on the value of a 
given dependent variable exert no effective influence on it, and the value does not 
change. Indeed, the marshaled influences for change cannot overcome the pressures 
for maintaining the status quo as the ‘friction’ is too great. However, the range exists 
between an upper bound and a lower bound. Above the upper bound, the pressure for 
an upward change in the dependent variable’s value overcomes this friction and it 
moves upward; and conversely, below the lower bound, the pressure for downward 
change overcomes the friction and the variable takes on new lower values. 
                                                 
1 Rosett (1959), p. 263. 
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Figure 1: Schematic Diagram of a Friction Model. 
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The focus of Rosett’s interest was in mapping how changes of yield impacted on how 
much of an asset would be held by investors in their portfolios. His model is laid out 
in Figure 12 where the observed values of a response variable Y (asset holding) are 
plotted against an independent variable (yield). The observed y values are clustered 
close to the heavy black line and indeed are zero between the bounds αL and αU 
where pressure for change on Y is unable to overcome friction. The thin curve through 
the origin depicts the theoretical path of Y in the absence of that friction. 
The bounds, the slope of the line and the standard deviation of the underlying 
distribution are all parameters of the LDV Friction Model and are determined by 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
Maximum likelihood estimation itself is a technique for determining parameter values 
that make the pattern of data we have observed most likely to have occurred in that 
particular pattern. A very useful aspect of it is that it does not require strict adherence 
to the linearity assumption required by OLS regression. It makes most sense if 
maximum likelihood estimation is explained from first principles. In terms of basic 
statistical analysis, we are often interested in determining the probability of an event Y 
conditional on the occurrence of X, which is expressed as ( )P Y X . X may be a 
variable denoting an event or a state. However, X might be replaced by “p” (for 
                                                 
2 Rosett (1959), Figure 1, p. 263. However, in Figure  above, the terminology used follows Figure 6.2 
on p. 164 of Maddala (1983) more closely than Rosett’s original figure’s terminology. However, 
Rosett’s and Maddala’s figures and mine are equivalent. Maddala (1983) provided an excellent 
summary of friction models in general. 
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parameter), as it may actually be a parameter of the distribution of Y itself. Maximum 
likelihood estimation is about solving ( )L p Y , where L is the likelihood function of p 
given Y. 
Rosett’s model is adapted for use in the current study. It was also employed with 
respect to share returns by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) — albeit not with 
the intention of estimating abnormal returns to replace those furnished by the Market 
Model methodology in a thinly-traded market. These authors argued that zero-value 
share returns occur when transactions costs are higher than the cash return an investor 
could make if he or she actually traded and interpreted the distance between Lα  and 
Uα  as a de facto total transactions cost for buyers and sellers. If these ‘round-trip’ 
transactions costs were not going to be exceeded, then either the potential buyer or the 
potential seller, or both, would have no incentive to transact and no trade would 
occur. The underlying independent variable, X for Lesmond et al, was returns on the 
market index ( MtR ), which they postulated would have near-zero values when 
companies furnished zero-value daily returns. This assumption makes the model 
suitable as a replacement for the Market Model in the current study. 
However, while Rosett and Lesmond et al employed one independent variable, the 
current study goes on to develop an LDV friction model employing multiple 
independent variables to model the trading reaction of investors in response to the 
event window announcement of dividend and earnings news. 
The post-Rozett era of friction-modelling research begins with Dagenais (1969), who 
developed a model containing horizontal and a vertical calibrations for each of the 
bounds measured in Rozett’s original friction model.  Dagenais suggested that his 
new model would be appropriate for examining the path of the price of newsprint with 
respect to the paper industry’s operating capacity and marginal costs of production. 
Two other possible applications were the determination of planned factory expansion 
in the steel industry, given known excess capacity; and household consumption of 
whiteware given the stock of whiteware already owned and household income. Three 
years later, Dagenais (1975) applied his model to the American household purchases 
of automobiles.  However, ensuing researchers have tended to prefer Rozett’s simpler 
model over what Dagenais developed. 
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DeSarbo, Rao, Steckel, Wind and Colombo (1987) developed a friction model to 
explain and forecast a firm’s product-pricing decision. The most interesting aspect of 
their modelling was in their computation of the upper and lower bounds delimiting the 
price-no-change continuum and a prediction of by how much a price change would be 
a price-change decision.  Citing Dharmadhikari and Joag-dev (1985)3 who found that 
the maximum likelihood function may be multimodal with more than one set of 
estimates, they calculated their parameter values via a controlled random search 
procedure modified from Price (1976)4.  DeSarbo et al then applied their model to 82 
weeks of mortgage interest rate information from 15 Philadelphia banks and found 
that their friction model outperformed equivalent forecasting computations generated 
from OLS and a Box-Jenkins procedure.5 
Forbes and Mayne (1989) examined the behaviour of the prime lending rate 
(compiled as the monthly average of US banks’ annualised daily prime rates). The 
prime rate tends to remain unchanged and therefore apparently unresponsive to 
changes in money market rates unless these move above or below some pair of 
tolerance limits. Forbes and Mayne used monthly data that were averaged from daily 
rates, and which covered US bank figures published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
for the decade from January 1977 to August 1987. 
Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) used friction modelling to shed light on the US 
dollar – Deutschmark exchange rate (daily data) in the period February 1987 to 
October 1989 with respect to market interventions by the US Federal Reserve and the 
Bundesbank. In addition, they observed the US Federal Reserve’s interventions in the 
US dollar – Japanese yen market.  These authors stressed that central banks tended 
not to intervene very often on the ground that the main function of an intervention 
was to send a signal to private traders, alerting them to the banks’ preferred direction 
of exchange-rate change. Indeed, there were two good reasons behind this. First, 
while their intervention volumes could be in excess of a hundred million dollars, 
central banks never traded (and were not able to trade) more than a small fraction, by 
volume, of overall trading in any given day. Therefore the banks could not determine 
the market by brute force and had to rely on persuasion. Second, any attempt at 
                                                 
3 DeSarbo, Rao, Steckel, Wind and Colombo (1987), p. 308 
4 Ibid, p. 308 
5 Ibid, p. 312. With respect to the comparison with OLS, the friction model produced an Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) of 83.67 versus an AIC from OLS of103.52. 
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micromanagement by frequent intervention would diminish the efficacy of the 
signalling function. 
Hashimoto and Takatoshi (2004) employed a friction model to examine contagion 
effects in Asian markets between exchange rates and share prices. Among their 
results, the authors found that the Thai exchange rate was sensitive to shocks in the 
stock markets of other Asian countries. 
Galpin (2004) investigated the cost of raising capital in a pecking order theory 
context, used a friction model to map a firm’s financing function. The decision to 
raise new capital (either debt or equity represented by the subscript i), or to return it to 
investors, was dependent on the size of the associated transactions costs.  
With respect to the nature of dividend-setting, Cragg (1986) used friction modelling 
to model dividend-setting behaviour along the path to a perceived target payout ratio.  
Cragg used 218 US companies whose fiscal years coincided with the calendar year 
and for which at least 20 years of continuous price information was available between 
1959 and 1982.  He concluded that firms did indeed only change their dividends when 
there was only a low probability that the change would have to be reversed in the 
future. He noted6 that the firms’ lower bound tended to vary to a much greater degree 
than their upper bound. In a signalling sense, this implied that firms are much more 
uncertain about when to cut dividends than they are about when to raise them.  
Kao and Wu (1994) developed a friction model examining the relationship between 
changes in a firm’s permanent earnings and its dividend policy, and found there was a 
positive relationship between the two variables.  While Cragg’s (1986) model was 
fairly traditional in containing three partitions (change down, no change, change up) 
and determined its bounds endogenously, Kao and Wu adopted a K-level model in 
which each observed value of the dividend paid, Dt was a discrete level.  More 
generally, Kao and Wu concluded that dividends are strongly related to the estimated 
level of a firm’s permanent earnings, and that dividend changes are reactions to both 
expected and unexpected changes in the latter. Further, they considered that their 
friction model had successfully coped with the estimation problem associated with the 
tendency of firms to leave their dividends unchanged from period to period. In 
addition, their results showed that the concept of dividend signalling did not conflict 
                                                 
6 Ibid, pp. 204-205 and Table 10.4 (lower panel). 
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with Lintner’s (1956) concept of a partial adjustment towards a long-term target 
payout ratio. Instead, they found that their sample firms’ dividend-setting behaviour 
was consistent with both. 
Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) used a friction model to obtain estimates of 
effective transactions costs associated with marginal traders’ buying and selling 
shares. They argued that the method was a viable alternative to the use of the sum of 
the bid-ask spread and commission approach that was considered to be current 
orthodoxy. The friction model approach required only sets of time series of daily 
security returns. The incidence of zero returns (for days of either no change in price or 
even days on which the stock fails to trade at all) was a phenomenon that could be 
turned to good account in terms of a friction model approach as it was in the nature of 
investor decision-making for zero trades to occur where the potential return to be 
made was not expected to exceed a threshold imposed by the cost of the trade.7  It is 
of interest that Lesmond et al’s model assumed that the market model was the correct 
model of security returns, and that the intercept term captures the effect of any 
misspecification of the market index relating to mean-variance inefficiency.8 
However, Lesmond et al suppressed the intercept term in their model. 
                                                 
7 Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), p.1115. The authors noted that zero returns are a frequent 
phenomenon, even with respect to firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX in the period they studied 
which was 1963-1990. They noted, “…[A]s much as 80% of the smallest firms returns are zero and 
some of the largest firms have 30% zero returns.” 
8 Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), p.1120. 
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3 Data and Variables 
Because methodology in this paper is proposed as an alternative to a simple Market 
Model event study methodology, I follow the data requirements that could be 
considered conventional in event studies.  The announcement event will be deemed to 
be a single day, t0, seated in the middle of a 21-day test period (days t-10 to t10).  The 
test period will be preceded by an expected return estimation period of exactly 100 
days, which in turns requires closing price information for the 111 days running from 
days t-121 to t-11 (inclusive).  This imposed the restriction that 121 days of closing price 
information (adjusted for dividend payments and share splits) had to be available 
running up to each day t0 event; and that these 121 days were required to be clear of 
any prior dividend and earnings announcement.  In addition, the company had to be 
either a company that regularly paid ordinary dividends, or was now omitting, 
initiating or resuming the payment of an ordinary dividend following a phase of not 
paying them.  This removed firms that never paid dividends from consideration.  
Furthermore, the 21-day test period needed to be free of other announcements that 
might confound the detection of a dividend signal.  These were: 
1. Announcements of special dividends 
2. Announcements of changes in capital structure with respect to debt 
3. Share buybacks and other announcements of capital reduction 
4. Earnings forecast announcements 
5. Bonus share issue announcements 
6. Rights issue announcements 
7. Announcements concerning options 
8. Announcements of impending take-overs 
9. Announcements of company revaluations 
10. Follow-up announcements of revisions of erroneous data in an announcement 
11. Requests published by the NZX requiring a company to explain unusual (and 
potentially suspicious) changes in the market price of its shares 
The above considerations dropped the number of acceptable announcement events 
available within the decade starting January 3 1990 and ending December 31 1999 
from an initial 1910 to 948.9 
The joint dividend and earnings events could either be the ‘preliminary’ report to the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange made after the end of the company year, or the 
                                                 
9 This data is congruent with the data used in the writer’s Ph.D thesis, which was an event study 
employing the Market Model, friction models and state asset pricing models with respect to dividend 
signalling in a joint dividend and earnings announcement context.  
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‘interim’ report produced after the first six months of the company year.  In either 
case, the change in dividend was measured from the equivalent announcement made a 
year earlier (and likewise for earnings). 
The variables of interest were as follows.  jtR , the observed return on a share in 
Company j on day t, and MtR , the observed return on the market index on day t, were 
required for each day in the estimation and test periods for the computation of an 
abnormal return, jtAR , for each day in the test period.  In addition, 
jDAYSTRADED reported the count of actual market trading days, out of the 100 
available in the estimation period, on which share j actually traded.  The thinner the 
trading, the lower the value this variable would take on. 
On the day of the event itself, measures of the change in dividend DPSΔ and the 
change in earnings EPSΔ  were required, along with dummy variables modelling the 
interaction effect between the direction of change in dividends and the direction fo 
change in earnings.  These become relevant in subsection 5.2.5, where I replace the 
restricted least squares regression procedure with a further set of friction models. 
However, some comment on these variables is useful here.  The formulation of 
DPSΔ as a simple percentage change would have meant giving this variable an 
infinite value whenever dividends were initiated (or resumed after a non-dividend-
paying phase).  Hence an alternative measure that was robust to the inclusion of 
dividend initiation announcements is used: 
 
1
j This Announcement j Announcement last year
j
jt
DPS DPS
DPS
P −
−Δ =  (1) 
 
This variable was in the nature of a dividend yield, where 1jtP −  was the adjusted 
closing price of a company j’s shares. 
The interaction dummies had to be reduced from the five used by Kane, Lee and 
Marcus (1984) and other studies employing restricted least squares regression) to just 
two in the context of a friction model containing three regions.  These two were 
GOOD+BADNEWS and MIXEDNEWSDNC.  GOOD+BADNEWS took on the value 
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‘1’ if an announcement entailed an increase in dividend and an increase in EPS (over 
last year’s), or the value ‘-1’ if there was a decrease in both dividend and in EPS, or 
‘0’ if the dividend and EPS changes did not move in the same direction.  The other 
dummy variable, MIXEDNEWSDNC took on the value ‘1’ if EPS increased while the 
dividend remained unchanged, or ‘-1’ if EPS decreased while the dividend remained 
unchanged.  If the dividend changed from the previous year’s figure, then 
MIXEDNEWSDNC took on the value ‘0’. 
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4 Friction Model Methodology 
In this section I will deal with the methodology which replaces the simple OLS 
regression employed by the Market Model; but will leave discussion of the models 
that replace the piggy-backed step of restricted least squares regression until 
subsection 0.  I will start by more closely defining the nature of the observed return, 
jtR .  This may take on positive, zero or negative values, and — depending on the 
thinness of trading of the particular company share — there may be many zero values. 
It is assumed that a zero value will be associated with small values of returns on the 
market index. On average, jtR  will take on values that follow the three-part linear 
(zig-zag) path depicted in Figure 2, which implies it will move in the same direction 
as changes in the market, MtR . 
 
Figure 2: Schematic Diagram of a Friction Model for Calculation of Expected Returns. 
 
Rjt 
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Ljα  
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The line segment between Ljα  and Ujα  explicitly represents the region in which zero-
value returns are expected — which means that this initial model sets out to model the 
effect of these (whether they be generated by prices that fail to shift or by the absence 
of trading in the share) and therefore impound them into the estimation of expected 
return parameters. 
A “true” daily return for company j, is denoted as *jtR . Unfortunately this remains 
unobserved; however it would theoretically furnish near-zero values commensurate 
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with those small values of market index returns in keeping with the curve that sweeps 
through the origin in Figure 2. The model is set up as follows: 
 
*
* *
*
* *
if
0 if
if
jt j Mt jt
jt jt Lj jt Lj
jt Lj jt Uj
jt jt Uj jt Uj
R R
Where
R R R
R R
R R R
β ε
α α
α α
α α
= +
⎧ = − <⎪⎪ = ≤ ≤⎨⎪ = − >⎪⎩
 (2) 
 
 
However, the fact that *jtR  is unobservable and Ljα  and Ujα  are endogenous makes 
Equation (2) hard to work with. The specification of inputs into the model’s 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure requires some simplification of this. 
In the world at large, and in this study’s data set, it is quite possible for jtR  to be 
negative instead of positive in a rising market, or positive when the market is falling 
— hence we can expect a cloud of both positive and negative observations to be 
associated with increases in the independent variable, MtR . Hence, the assignment of 
observations to the upper region is not dependent on the sign of the unobservable *jtR  
or the observed jtR , but on the requirement that MtR  is positive. (However the 
theoretical locus of *jtR  values in Figure 2 does ordain that 
*
jtR  is positive when MtR  
is positive.) Likewise, whatever the sign of jtR , the lower region requires the 
matching MtR  observation to be negative. A practical implementation of the model is 
as follows10: 
                                                 
10This is developed from Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), pp. 1120 – 1122. It will immediately 
be obvious that Equation (3) differs in its restrictions from those stated in their Equation (1); but 
Equation (3) has been altered to take into account Lesmond et al’s sentence (p.1122) in which they 
explain that in their likelihood function (Equation (2)) that “…R1 and R2 denote the regions where the 
measured return, jtR  is nonzero in negative and positive market return regions, respectively. R0 
denotes the zero returns.” This interpretation was confirmed in an email communication with Dr 
Lesmond, who also kindly made part of his thesis (pertaining to methodology) and his Fortran code 
available. 
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*
*
if 0 0
0 if 0
if 0 0
jt jt Lj jt Mt
jt jt
jt jt Uj jt Mt
R R R and R
R R
R R R and R
α
α
⎧ = − ≠ <⎪⎪ = =⎨⎪ = − ≠ >⎪⎩
 (3) 
 
The final embedded assumption is that the non-zero observations of jtR  are normally 
distributed. This was found to be the case with 33.23% of the data sets in terms of a 
Lilliefors Test with a five percent error, while the returns distributions with zero-value 
returns included was 3.10 percent. One advantage of assuming a normal distribution 
of non-zero observations is that the normal probability density function and the 
cumulative normal density function can be used in the maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure. Further, it allows for the computation of Z-values (from which 
confidence intervals can be calculated), and the testing of parameters for significant 
differences from zero can be performed and the associated p-values can be recorded. 
In keeping with Equations (2) and (3) the three-part likelihood function is shown in 
Equation (4): 
 
 ( )
0
1 3
1 1Pr no change
LOWER UPPER
t t
t R t R t Rj j
L ε εφ φσ σ σ σ∈ ∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∏ ∏ ∏  (4) 
 
Here the symbols RLOWER, R0 and RUPPER stand for the three regions depicted in Figure  
and t denotes an observation assigned to a given region. The lower region accounts 
for decreasing company returns (give or take the presence of some anomalous 
increasing observations), the zero region contains company returns that are zero in 
value, and the upper region accounts for increasing returns (allowing for the presence 
of anomalous decreasing company return observations). In Equation (4), tL
εφ σ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  is 
the standard normal density function of the residuals of the negative returns in the 
lower region, and tU
εφ σ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  the standard normal density function of the residuals of the 
positive returns in the upper region, where σ  is the standard deviation estimated from 
the sample of all observations of observed returns excluding the zero value 
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observations assigned to the zero region. In accordance with Lesmond et al (1999) 
and Maddala (1983), the full likelihood function, complete with parameters to be 
estimated is presented in Equation (5), where ( )LΦ ⋅  and ( )UΦ ⋅  are the cumulative 
normal density functions of the standard normal distribution for lower and upper 
regions. 
 
( )
0
1, , , ,
1
jt Lj j Mt
Lj Uj j j jt Mt L
L j j
Uj j Mt Lj j Mt
U L
j j
jt Uj j Mt
U
U j j
R R
L R R
R R
R R
α βα α β σ φσ σ
α β α β
σ σ
α βφσ σ
⎡ ⎤+ − ⋅= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− ⋅ − ⋅× Φ −Φ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − ⋅× ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∏
∏
∏
 (5) 
 
 
In natural logarithmic terms, the likelihood function becomes: 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
1 2
2 2 1
3 1
0
2
1 2
2 2 3
1 1ln ln
22
ln
1 1ln
22
jt Lj j Mt
L j
j
Uj j Mt Lj j Mt
j j
j j
jt Uj j Mt
U j
j
L R R
R R
R R
α βσπσ
α β α β
σ σ
α βσπσ
= − + − ⋅
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− ⋅ − ⋅+ Φ −Φ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
+ − + − ⋅
∑ ∑
∑
∑ ∑
 (6) 
 
 
The negative of this likelihood function is then minimised to produce solutions for the 
two bounds, Ljα  and Ujα , and for the two other parameters, jβ  and jσ . This 
minimisation process is achieved by a quasi-Newton non-linear numerical 
optimisation procedure called ‘optim’ in Scilab.11 The fact that the process is non-
linear liberates friction model methodology from the linear assumption required by 
the Market Model.  
                                                 
11 The computer software which was ultimately used for estimating all friction model procedures was 
Scilab, which turned out to be far more user-friendly than Matlab for this purpose. 
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Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) was largely based on Lesmond (1995), which 
furnished two methods for computing the expected return, E(Rj) developed from 
Maddala (1983) — one for an unconditional expected return which includes the zero-
return region, and the other for a conditional expected return, which excludes returns 
falling in the zero region. 
Lesmond’s unconditional expected return formulation is as follows12: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
Pr 0 0 Pr 0 0
Pr 0 0
1
0
1
1
1
j j j j j j j
j j j
jL jL j M jL jL jL j M
jU jL
jU jU j M jU jU jU j M
jL jU
jL jL j M j jU jU j M j
jUjL
jL
E R R E R R R E R R
R E R R
R E R
R E R
R R
α β ε ε α β
α β ε ε α β
φ φα β σ α β σ
α
= < ⋅ < + = ⋅ =
+ > ⋅ >
⎡ ⎤= −Φ − + + < − +⎣ ⎦
+ Φ −Φ ⋅
⎡ ⎤+Φ − + + < − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= −Φ − + − +Φ − + +⎢ ⎥Φ−Φ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
= − ( ) ( ) ( )1jL jU jU j M jU jL j jU jLRα β σ φ φ−Φ − Φ + +Φ −Φ + −
 (7) 
                                                 
12 Lesmond (1995), Chapter 3, Subsection 3.2.1, Equation 14. This chapter was provided electronically 
by the author. 
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Equation (7) shows that the unconditional expected return builds in the influence of 
market (systematic) risk captured by the Market Model (and by all CAPM models), 
and in addition incorporates the influence of effective transactions costs — the 
estimation and nature of which were the primary focus of interest for Lesmond (1995) 
and Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999). Also, the presence of σ  in the equation 
indicates that variance in a set of company returns is, in Lesmond’s words, “a priced 
element”.13 With respect to the formulation of conditional expected returns, the zero-
returns argument is dropped out of Equation (7) and the specification becomes14: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
0 Pr 0 0 Pr 0 0
1
j j j j j j j j
jL j M jL jL jL j M
jU j M jU jU jU j M
jU jL
jL jU j M j
jLjU
E R R R E R R R E R R
R E R
R E R
R
α β ε ε α β
α β ε ε α β
φ φα α β σ
≠ = < ⋅ < + > ⋅ >
⎡ ⎤= − + + < − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − + + < − +⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − + + + −⎜ ⎟Φ+Φ⎝ ⎠
 (8) 
 
Both formulations of expected return are useable, with respect to the current study, in 
the determination of ARs if these are to be employed as the dependent variable in a 
cross-sectional restricted least squares regression. But only the conditional expected 
return is useful when an LDV friction model is developed in subsection 5.2 (and 
onward) for analysis of what happens at the time of the dividend and earnings 
announcement event, employing DPSΔ  and EPSΔ  as independent variables. The 
methodological details of that friction model are provided in that later subsection 
along with its results. 
                                                 
13 Ibid, final sentence of Subsection 3.2.2. 
14 Ibid, Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.2, Equation 15. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Estimation of Expected Returns on the 100-day Period 
When the 948 company/event estimation period data sets were passed to the LDV 
friction model procedure, only 25 of them could not be processed on the ground of 
insufficient observations in any one region. This dropped the sample size to 923. 
Given that the company/event sets were scheduled in descending order in terms of the 
variable, ‘ jDAYSTRADED ’ (the number of market days on which the company’s 
shares actually changed hands), it became clear that the dysfunctional sets were at the 
bottom end. Ten of these were the ten most poorly-traded stocks in the study, while 
the other 15 are all numbered within the poorest-traded 45. The best-transacted of 
these, event set No. 904, traded on only 28 of the 100 days, while the least, No. 948, 
traded on a total of 4 days. 
Figure 3 summarises the characteristics of the 923 optimised sets of parameters. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the 923 Optimised Sets of Parameters. 
Parameter Mean Minimum Maximum Std Deviation 
Lα  -0.0304 -0.2499 -0.0012 0.0293 
Uα  0.0297 0.0007 0.2960 0.0291 
β  2.0346 0.4962 19.388 1.2279 
σ  0.0277 0.0069 0.2020 0.0185 
 
 
The dataset furnishing the highest beta was No. 544, which traded on 89 days, and 
which contained two large outliers — one negative and one positive. This certainly 
indicates that the LDV friction model estimates are sensitive to outliers. In the third 
panel of Figure 3, which contains histograms of the four parameters, it is clear that the 
betas are quite closely clustered about the mean of 2.03 with some skewing to the 
right. This mean is much larger than the mean beta of 0.472 furnished by the Market 
Model on the same data.  It is also much more credible given that firms in the sample 
are not necessarily large firms at all — although the maintenance of a dividend payout 
policy does argue that the firms will tend to be relatively stable. Arguably this is a 
function of the exclusion of zero observations. With respect to the bounds Lα  and 
Uα , most observations have an absolute value closer to zero than 0.05, while 
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observations with values in excess of 0.1±  can be considered to be outliers. With 
respect to the standard deviations in the fourth panel, most appear to be less than 0.05. 
 
Figure 3: Histograms of the Four Parameters of the Friction model. 
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Perhaps more interesting than the estimated parameters themselves are the expected 
returns generated from them. The summary characteristics of all 923 distributions of 
unconditional and conditional expected returns (as measured over the 100-day 
estimation period) are shown in Table 2 along with the equivalent results underlying 
the OLS estimation procedures calculated here for convenience. 
In the first column of Panel A, it is clear that the LDV friction model furnishes 
expected return distributions that have means that have a higher absolute value, and 
that these distributions exhibit greater variation. However, with respect to size, the 
unconditional expected returns have the greatest positive value while the conditional 
ones are actually negative. The OLS expected returns, on average are positive and 
closer to zero. This implies that, for observed returns on day t0 that are relatively large 
and positive, the unconditional expected returns could be predicted to furnish smaller 
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abnormal returns than the OLS model, while the conditional expected return would 
actually produce the largest AR. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Expected Returns. 
Expected Return 
Distributions1 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std Deviation 
Panel A: Expected Return Distribution Means (100-Day Estimation Period) 
Unconditional 0.0013 0.0290 - 0.0251 0.0044 
Conditional - 0.0062 0.0066 - 0.0436 0.0054 
OLS Exp. Return 
Distributions 
0.0004 0.0093 -0.0083 0.0022 
Panel B: Expected Return Distribution Standard Deviations (100-Day 
Estimation Period) 
Unconditional 0.0165 0.0906 0.0046 0.0084 
Conditional 0.0154 0.1203 0.0025 0.0093 
OLS Exp. Return 
Distributions 
0.0050 0.0361 3.19E-06 0.00485 
Panel C: Expected Return Distribution Means (21-Day Test Period) 
Unconditional Expected 
Returns 
0.0002 0.0252 - 0.0463 0.0060 
Conditional Expected 
Returns 
- 0.0073 0.0112 - 0.0577 0.0068 
OLS Expected. Returns 9.76E-05 0.0118 -0.0150 0.0025 
Panel D: Expected Return Distribution Standard Deviations (21-Day Test 
Period) 
Unconditional Expected 
Returns 
0.0158 0.1366 0.0025 0.0113 
Conditional Expected 
Returns 
0.0150 0.1826 0 0.0124 
OLS Expected Returns 0.0044 0.0625 5.56E-06 0.0049 
1 923 sets of Expected Returns data 
 
 
Also in the 4th column of Panel A, the distribution of unconditional means has a 
standard deviation that is double that of the OLS means distribution to the four 
decimal places reported. The conditional mean distribution has yet a larger standard 
deviation. However, there is no immediate explanation for why the mean of the 
conditional means distribution should be negative. 
When forecasted forward onto market return data available in the 21-day test period, 
the LDV friction model unconditional expected returns (reported in Panels C and D), 
again turned out to be larger than those produced by OLS, while the conditional 
expected returns continued to be smaller. The effect indeed was that the test period 
ARs based on unconditional expected returns were the smallest; and those based on 
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the LDV friction model conditional returns were the largest. The AR distributions’ 
mean and standard deviation characteristics are reported in Table 3: 
It is a very interesting question as to why the LDV friction model furnishes 
conditional expected returns that are smaller rather than larger than OLS estimates, 
and therefore ARs which are larger. When no trade took place on a particular day (or 
there was at least one trade but the closing price just did not change), the zero value of 
jtR  was assigned to the expected return and also to the AR for that day — and 
Equation (8) did not apply. 
Table 3: Comparison of Characteristics of Abnormal Returns. 
Expected Return 
Distributions1 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std Deviation
Panel A: Abnormal Return Distribution Means (21-Day Test Period)  
Unconditional Abnormal 
Returns -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0016 0.0007 
Conditional Abnormal 
Returns 0.0071 0.0092 0.0062 0.0007 
OLS Abnormal Returns -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0015 0.0006 
Panel B: Abnormal Return Distribution Standard Deviations (21-Day Test 
Period) 
Unconditional Abnormal 
Returns 0.0287 0.0560 0.0235 0.0070 
Conditional Abnormal 
Returns 0.0285 0.0564 0.0218 0.0074 
OLS Abnormal Returns 0.0239 0.0540 0.0185 0.0078 
1 923 sets of 21-day test period results 
 
 
One item which surfaced as a result of investigating this question was that there was 
one company/event data set which furnished nothing but zero values for jtR  over the 
entire test period (the 889th ranked by number of actively traded days, which recorded 
only 33 trades in the 100-day estimation period.) 
5.2 Friction Models of the Day Zero Event Window 
I now propose a friction model that removes the need to resort to any regression 
procedure in searching for evidence investor behaviour indicative of a response to a 
dividend signal. Initially, the 923 observations of day zero conditional abnormal 
returns derived from the friction model in subsection 5.2.1 will be used as the 
dependent variable in a friction model procedure in which the independent variable is 
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DPSΔ . Then, in a second sweep in subsection 5.2.2, this independent variable will be 
replaced by EPSΔ . Following that in subsection 0, both independent variables will be 
employed together. 
5.2.1 Conditional Abnormal Returns and ΔDPS 
The LDV friction model in the first instance is: 
 
*
*
*
if 0 0
0 if 0
if 0 0
j j j j
j j Lj j j
j j
j j Uj j j
AR DPS
Where
AR AR AR and DPS
AR AR
AR AR AR and DPS
β ε
α
α
= Δ +
⎧ = − ≠ Δ <⎪⎪ = =⎨⎪ = − ≠ Δ ≥⎪⎩
 (9) 
The results obtained from this procedure are reported in Table 4. Below a 5.49 percent 
lower bound, a change in dividend is associated with an increasingly negative AR, 
while above a 1.53 percent upper bound, the change in dividend is associated with a 
rising positive AR. The linear approximation of the rate of change ( DPSβΔ ) is strongly 
significantly different from zero; but the rate of change is quite small (0.0018 per unit 
change in the dividend variable. The results are reported as point estimates in the 
table’s first column, and in terms of a 95 percent confidence interval in the second and 
third columns. It must be emphasised that this model is misspecified at least to the 
extent that it totally ignores the role of the simultaneous earnings announcement 
information. 
 
Table 4: Conditional Abnormal Returns on Day Zero and ΔDPS. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0549 -0.0603 -0.0495 0.0000 
αU 0.0153 0.0120 0.0186 0.0000 
βΔDPS 0.0018 0.0011 0.0024 0.0000 
σ 0.0385 0.0361 0.0408 0.0000 
923 observations 
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5.2.2 Conditional Abnormal Returns and ΔEPS 
When we replace the change-in-dividend variable with a change-in-earnings variable, 
the LDV friction model has one subtle change. Because, EPSΔ  never exactly equals 
zero, the inequalities in the conditions become strict inequalities: 
 
*
*
*
if 0 0
0 if 0
if 0 0
j j j j
j j Lj j j
j j
j j Uj j j
AR EPS
Where
AR AR AR and EPS
AR AR
AR AR AR and EPS
β ε
α
α
= Δ +
⎧ = − ≠ Δ <⎪⎪ = =⎨⎪ = − ≠ Δ >⎪⎩
 (10) 
The results are very similar to those reported on DPSΔ . There is approximately a 6% 
range about zero defined by αL at –4.08% and αU at 2.15% outside which a change in 
announced earnings does impact on the size of abnormal earnings; but the rate of 
change of this impact is again small (0.0008 per unit change in the earnings variable). 
And again the model is misspecified in the absence of the dividend announcement 
variable. However, the EPSΔ  coefficient (0.0008) in Table 5 is under half the size of 
the DPSΔ coefficient (0.0018) reported above in Table 4Error! Reference source 
not found.. 
Table 5: Conditional Abnormal Returns on Day Zero and ΔEPS. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0408 -0.0449 -0.0366 0.0000 
αL 0.0215 0.0179 0.0252 0.0000 
βΔEPS 0.0008 0.0004 0.0012 0.0000 
σ 0.0383 0.0360 0.0406 0.0000 
923 observations 
 
 
5.2.3 Conditional Abnormal Returns and both ΔEPS and ΔEPS 
Where the friction modelling covered so far in this paper has been developed and 
adapted from the work of Lesmond (1995) and Lesmond, Ogden and Trzinka (1999), 
all of the models from here onward have at least two independent variables and were 
inspired by (but not necessarily closely modelled on) the exchange rate intervention 
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model employed by Almekinders and Eiffinger (1996).  As soon a second 
independent variable has been brought into consideration, there are two possible ways 
of defining the model’s upper and lower regions. Both are reported in this subection.  
The first way is to define the prerequisite for upper region membership as 0jAR ≠  
and 
2
1
0i
i
X
=
≥∑  where 2
1
ij j j
i
X DPS EPS
=
=Δ + Δ∑ ; and for lower region membership, 
0jAR ≠  and 
2
1
0i
i
X
=
<∑ . This configuration allowed all 923 observations to be used. 
The model is: 
 ( )
( )
*
1 2
*
*
if 0 0
0 if 0
if 0 0
j j j j j j
j j Lj j j j
j j
j j Uj j j j
AR DPS EPS
Where
AR AR AR and EPS DPS
AR AR
AR AR AR and EPS DPS
β β ε
α
α
= Δ + Δ +
⎧ = − ≠ Δ + Δ <⎪⎪ = =⎨⎪ = − ≠ Δ + Δ ≥⎪⎩
 (11) 
In the result of the maximum likelihood procedure reported in Table 6, it is strongly 
clear that the beta of the change in dividend variable is insignificantly different from 
zero in the presence of an earnings announcement variable.  
Table 6: Conditional Abnormal Returns on Day Zero and both ΔDPS and ΔEPS (N = 923). 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0403 -0.0443 -0.0362 0.0000 
αL 0.0206 0.0170 0.0243 0.0000 
βΔDPS -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0006 0.4120 
βΔEPS 0.0008 0.0004 0.0012 0.0000 
σ 0.0374 0.0351 0.0397 0.0000 
923 observations including the DD-EI and DI-ED announcement combinations 
 
 
It can also be seen that the size of the friction region between the two bounds in Table 
6 implies that a 6 percent change in the independent variables is necessary before any 
response is picked up in the AR variable. 
However, there is a hidden aspect to this result. Two of the dividend and earnings 
announcement combinations comprise mixed news in which the two components 
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move in opposite directions (the DD-EI and DI-ED observations). This means that 
one had to dominate the other in size in order for the assignment to either upper or 
lower region to happen. This effectively built in a hidden assumption to the effect that 
a change in earnings should have the same value as a change in dividend — and that a 
larger change in one should rightfully dominate the smaller change in the other (even 
if the difference in size was actually quite small). This assumption can be jettisoned 
by requiring that the independent variables must each be greater than or equal to zero 
for assignment to the upper region, and less than or equal to zero for the lower region. 
However, this altered specification comes at the cost of removing the DD-EI and DI-
ED observations from the data set. Nevertheless, it does still allow analysis to occur 
with respect to observations in which earnings change while dividends do not (the 
DNC-EI and DNC-ED combinations). The re-specified model looks like this: 
 
*
1 2
*
*
if 0 0, 0
0 if 0
if 0 0, 0
j j j j j j
j j Lj j j j
j j
j j Uj j j j
AR DPS EPS
Where
AR AR AR and EPS DPS
AR AR
AR AR AR and EPS DPS
β β ε
α
α
= Δ + Δ +
⎧ = − ≠ Δ < Δ ≤⎪⎪ = =⎨⎪ = − ≠ Δ > Δ ≥⎪⎩
 (12) 
The result furnished in Table 7 is quite different from that in Table 6. Now, the beta 
of the change-in-dividend variable is more than four times larger than that of the 
change-in-earnings variable; and the p-values of all parameters indicate the 
probability of a Type 1 error of much less than one percent. 
 
Table 7: Conditional Abnormal Returns on Day Zero and both ΔDPS and ΔEPS. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0533 -0.0603 -0.0463 0.0000 
αU 0.0257 0.0193 0.0320 0.0000 
βΔDPS 0.0055 0.0043 0.0068 0.0000 
βΔEPS 0.0017 0.0010 0.0024 0.0000 
σ 0.0680 0.0640 0.0719 0.0000 
807 observations that exclude the DI-ED and DD-EI announcement combinations 
Minimum Likelihood Estimate = -466.21223 
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The independent variables in Table 7 exert their effect on the dependent variable, AR 
above and below a friction region between the upper and lower alphas, which 
amounts to almost 0.08 in width. This is one third larger than the six percent recorded 
in Table 6. The results in Table 7 suggest that, both the dividend component of an 
announcement and the earnings component play a significant role in price change on 
day zero. 
The behaviour of the bounds, Lα  and Uα  in Table 7 is also of interest. Lesmond, 
Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) argued, with respect to the relation between company 
returns and returns on the market index, that investors tend not to transact when the 
perceived gain from trading does not exceed what they call the round trip effective 
transaction cost. The fact that RMt has been replaced in Equation (12) by other 
independent variables does not change the bounds from being a measure of some 
form of effective transactions cost. However, we are no longer just dealing with a 
possible monetary cost, but also with a loss-aversion effect. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), in their promulgation of prospect theory, documented loss aversion as one of 
the key behaviours identifiable in decision makers making choices under uncertainty; 
and this was observed, in terms of a ‘disposition effect’ by Odean (1998) in a study of 
a brokerage firm’s transactions records showing client reluctance to realise losses but 
greater eagerness to realise gains. More recently, Norsworthy, Gorener, Morgan, 
Schuler and Li (2004) have confirmed the presence of loss aversion in share market 
trading behaviour, which they were able to identify in the results generated by their 
four-state asset-pricing model. Here, in Table 7 we can see evidence of the disposition 
effect in the fact that the lower bound is approximately twice the distance from zero 
measured by the upper bound. It appears that investors will trade more readily on the 
basis of good news, where the seller is able to realise a small profit, than on the basis 
of bad news where the seller would realise a small loss. The bad news has to be of a 
greater magnitude before sellers decide to divest. This asymmetry in the values of the 
bounds has also been apparent in Table 4, Table 5, and in Table 6. 
More importantly, the friction region between Lα  and Uα  can also be interpreted in a 
more direct manner with respect to dividend and earnings signalling. Between these 
two bounds the change in the announcement variables is too small for a signal to be 
sent — of at least too small to be acted upon. 
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5.2.4 Distinction between Day t0 and other Days in the 21-Day Test 
Period 
There is an announcement of dividends and earnings on day t0 only. In all other days 
of the test period, ARs are either related to other phenomena or to an anticipation of, 
or maybe a belated reaction to the day zero disclosure. DPSΔ  and EPSΔ  are now 
applied as leading or lagged independent variables in a series of procedures on the 
daily ARs — one procedure for each day of the 20 other days of the 21-day test 
period. 
A priori, one would expect very little change in the daily friction regions (between αL 
and αU). However, there should be steeper linear associations (captured by the betas) 
between the day zero ARs and the independent variables than with the ARs of any 
other day. That is, of course, unless there is leakage of the dividend and earnings 
information in advance.  The summary results are laid out in Table 8 and the next 
three figures. 
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Table 8: Parameter Estimates for All Days in the Test Period. 
Day αL αU βΔDPS βΔEPS σ
-0.0428 0.0222 0.0010 0.0006 0.0389
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0000)
-0.0398 0.0176 0.0011 0.0008 0.0336
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.0386 0.0197 0.0013 0.0002 0.0353
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.1967) (0.0000)
-0.0354 0.0175 0.0012 0.0006 0.0312
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000)
-0.0335 0.0145 0.0008 0.0001 0.0290
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0037) (0.2334) (0.0000)
-0.0377 0.0212 0.0019 0.0003 0.0371
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0574) (0.0000)
-0.0456 0.0228 0.0017 0.0004 0.0401
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0609) (0.0000)
-0.0340 0.0139 0.0007 0.0006 0.0322
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0139) (0.0014) (0.0000)
-0.0393 0.0178 0.0008 0.0006 0.0344
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0120) (0.0019) (0.0000)
-0.0446 0.0225 0.0006 0.0010 0.0405
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0674) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.0533 0.0257 0.0055 0.0017 0.0680
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.0404 0.0200 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0484
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3333) (0.0000)
-0.0429 0.0211 0.0009 0.0003 0.0396
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0124) (0.0605) (0.0000)
-0.0351 0.0176 0.0014 0.0006 0.0345
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0000)
-0.0378 0.0185 0.0015 0.0005 0.0351
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0084) (0.0000)
-0.0351 0.0155 0.0015 0.0002 0.0299
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1448) (0.0000)
-0.0364 0.0166 0.0015 0.0004 0.0344
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0255) (0.0000)
-0.0389 0.0185 0.0009 0.0003 0.0345
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0038) (0.0988) (0.0000)
-0.0375 0.0178 0.0013 0.0008 0.0314
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.0366 0.0173 0.0015 0.0004 0.0336
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0135) (0.0000)
-0.0341 0.0159 0.0008 0.0005 0.0298
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0041) (0.0027) (0.0000)
10
In each cell, the upper figure is the MLE parameter estimate and the lower 
figure in brackets is the associated p-value.
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In Table 8, all but one of the DPSβΔ  are significant at the five percent level of error or 
better; and there is a strong upward spike (0.0055) on day zero which is close to ten 
times the size of the beta for the preceding day (0.0006), and is about triple the size on 
all other days. This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: ΔDPS Coefficients over the 21-Day Test Period. 
Betas for Change in Dividends over the 21 Day Test Period
(Error bars = 95% Confidence Interval)
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This indicates that investors react to the dividend information and in doing so increase 
the ARs earned on day t0 in a manner that can be captured linearly (ie, the larger the 
change in dividend, the larger the associated AR). Arguably, the slight rises on days t-
5 and t-4 could be interpreted as investors acting on either anticipated or insider 
information; and the day t2 beta, which is the second highest in the test period could 
be seen as a belated reaction by late receivers of the disclosure. 
A similar pattern is observed in Figure 5 with respect to the EPSβΔ  results. However, 
the day zero spike (0.0017) is only one third of the magnitude of the day zero spike 
observed with respect to DPSβΔ  (0.0055). Further, there is a drop on day t1 which 
suggests that on that day there is next to no association between the earnings news 
and the new day’s trading. This really does suggest that the NZX is an efficient 
market — at least in the processing of earnings information. 
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Figure 5: ΔEPS Coefficients over the 21-Day Test Period. 
Betas for Change in Earnings over the 21 Day Test Period
(Error Bars = 95% Confidence Interval)
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Figure 6 contains the plots of αL and αU. There is a slight widening of the friction 
region on day t0; but this widening is hardly significant when one takes the 95% 
confidence intervals into account. 
 
 
Figure 6: Alpha Coefficients over the 21-Day Test Period 
αL and αU over the 21 Day Test Period
(Error bars = 95% Confidence Interval)
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In the final part of the results, a further LDV friction model configuration is proposed, 
which brings in several new independent variables in the nature of dummy variables 
in the RLS regression procedures. 
5.2.5 Day Zero Friction Model with First-order and Interaction 
Variables 
So far in this chapter, friction models have been employed to consider only the 
performance of the two first-order variables, DPSΔ  and .EPSΔ  A logical progression 
from this point would be to incorporate into a friction model some version of the 
dummy variables employed by Kane Lee and Marcus (1984), Easton (1991), Lonie et 
al (1996) and Anderson (2006) in their RLS regressions. 
In the cross-sectional regression procedure, five dummy variables were employed to 
ascertain the presence (or not) of a significant interaction effect. It was not possible to 
carry all these dummies over into the maximum likelihood estimation environment. 
There were several reasons for this. For a start, in a friction model context, we have 
two alpha values where the restricted least squares regression model furnished only 
one — which could take on the job of proxying the announcement combination for 
which no dummy variable was specified. One might ask, which of the MLE alphas 
would take up this role? More importantly, a dummy variable is binary, taking on the 
value ‘1’ if an observation belongs to the chosen category, or ‘0’ if it does not; and a 
binary variable is incapable of furnishing a set of values which fit into all three of the 
friction model’s three regions. The problem arises, that if there are no values present 
in a given region, then the maximum likelihood estimation procedure furnishes a 
hessian matrix with negatives present on the leading diagonal, which gives rise to 
standard errors which are the square roots of negative numbers — and are therefore 
imaginary. This means that the numerical search mechanism in the maximum 
likelihood procedure has failed to achieve convergence on an optimal value. 
Nevertheless, it is an interesting question as to whether the actual combination of 
dividend and earnings changes present in an announcement are significantly different 
from each other. Therefore the friction model was reconfigured to include the 
‘GOOD+BADNEWS’ and ‘MIXEDNEWSDNC’ dummy variables. 
The above variables left two dividend-and-earnings combinations unaccounted for. 
These were DI-ED (dividend increased with earnings decreased) and DD-EI.. These 
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had to be left out, as all attempts to configure summations of variables to circumvent 
the same-sign restriction (explained in subsection 0) merely ended up producing 
results with non-invertible hessian matrices. The implementation of the friction model 
was as follows.15 
*
1 2 3 4
*
*
if 0 0, 0, 0, 0
0 if 0
if 0 0, 0, 0, 0
j j j j j j G B j MIX j
j j Lj j j j G B MIX
j j
j j Uj j j j G B MIX
AR DPS EPS D D
Where
AR AR AR and EPS DPS D D
AR AR
AR AR AR and EPS DPS D D
β β β β ε
α
α
+
+
+
= Δ + Δ + + +
⎧ = − ≠ Δ < Δ ≤ ≤ ≤⎪⎪ = =⎨⎪ = − ≠ Δ > Δ ≥ > >⎪⎩
(13) 
When the DI-ED and DD-EI observations were excluded, the data set was now 
reduced to 807 observations. The results for the expanded model incorporating 
GOOD+BADNEWS and MIXEDNEWSDNC are in Table 9. In common with the 
unexpanded friction model, DPSβΔ  is about three time the size of EPSβΔ , and both are 
significant. However, both GOOD BAD NEWSβ +  and DNCMIXED NEWSβ are much larger than 
either of the first-order coefficients; and both are supported by p-values with less than 
a one percent level of error. This strongly supports the contention that investors are 
indeed reacting to a perception of an earnings signal at the very least. In addition, the 
fact that βGOOD+BADNEWS has a slightly higher value than βMIXEDNEWSDNC does suggest 
that the change in the announced dividend does amplify the effect of a change in 
announced earnings — which does not occur with respect to MIXEDNEWSDNC. 
                                                 
15 Specification of the restrictions in terms of the dummy variables was actually redundant as these 
were dependent on the restrictions associated with the two first-order variables. For instance, 
GOOD BAD NEWSD + could only be positive if DPSΔ  and DPSΔ  were both positive.  
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Table 9: Day Zero Parameters furnished by the Expanded Friction Model with Interaction 
Variables. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.1241 -0.1645 -0.0838 0.0000
αU 0.1030 0.0627 0.1433 0.0000
βΔDPS 0.0027 0.0013 0.0041 0.0001
βΔEPS 0.0007 0.0000 0.0015 0.0232
βGOOD+BADNEWS 0.1039 0.0634 0.1443 0.0000
βMIXEDNEWS 0.1001 0.0598 0.1404 0.0000
σ 0.0672 0.0633 0.0711 0.0000
This MLE procedure was run on 807 observations 
Minimum Likelihood Estimate = -605.26487 
 
 
But does the expanded model in Table 9 incorporating GOOD+BADNEWS and 
MIXEDNEWSDNC deliver an improvement in explanatory power over the 
unexpanded model? A likelihood ratio test was employed in Table 10 to answer this 
question. 
Table 10 
Unrestricted Model (Table 9) MLE = LUNRESTRICTED -605.26487 
Restricted Model (Table 7) MLE = LRESTRICTED -466.21223 
Likelihood Ratio = 2(LUNRESTRICTED - LRESTRICTED) -278.10528 
Number of restrictions 2 
p-value for a 22χ  distribution16  4.07573E-61 
 
 
The two MLE figures are minimum likelihood estimates which need to be multiplied 
by -1 to be viewed as maximum likelihood estimates. The absolute value of the 
difference between the unrestricted model with the two interaction dummies and the 
restricted model without dummies is 278.1053 which is somewhat larger than 9.21, 
the 22χ  critical value with a one percent Type 1 error probability. The p-value is 
0.0000 to four decimal places, and the expanded model incorporating interaction 
variables is clearly superior in its explanatory power. 
                                                 
16 Excel’s CHIDIST function was used for this computation. 
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6 Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper set out to do two things. The first was to provide a method for estimating 
expected returns which did not rely on all of the assumptions that are associated with 
the Market Model. For instance, the Market Model, by employing OLS regression 
requires linearity while the friction model’s employment of a quasi-Newton 
optimisation procedure liberates us from the linearity requirement. However, the 
procedure — as presented — did still make the assumption that the data was normally 
distributed. But the normality assumption too may be dropped if the normal 
cumulative density function and the normal probability density functions are replaced 
by their equivalents furnished by some other distribution such as the asymmetric 
power distribution (APD). Achieving this would be a logical next step in future 
employment of friction modelling with respect to event studies. 
The second goal of the paper was to provide a method for estimating expected returns 
which did not rely on sleight of hand or sheer blinkeredness in dealing with the 
thinness of trading of many of the stocks in the dataset. Far from sweeping non-
trading days and zero-value company returns under the carpet, the friction model 
methodology explicitly sets out to model their impact on the parameters employed in 
constructing expected returns. 
The third goal of this paper was to employ the ARs generated with respect to the 
expected return output of a friction model procedure on every feasible company/event 
estimation period dataset, to determine if any evidence of an investor reacting to a 
dividend signal could be found.  When the ARs were constructed from conditional 
expected returns, evidence of dividend signalling was not clear. With respect to the 
one-day event window, the two first-order variables were significant together — 
which is not enough to separate out their signalling effects from one another. The best 
that could be done was to report that the DPSΔ  coefficient was larger than the EPSΔ  
coefficient. 
The fourth goal of this paper was to develop friction models which could be used 
directly to investigate the behaviour in the event window. These models were 
restricted to either a one-day event window, or a one-day window in the context of the 
rest of the test period. They certainly showed both DPSΔ  and EPSΔ to be significant 
and that DPSΔ  was exerted a greater magnitude impact on the associated ARs. In the 
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final model, which incorporated two interaction variables modelling the effect of four 
of the six dividend and earnings interaction effects, some evidence was furnished that 
indicated that the dividend signal could be separated from the earnings signal — but 
the degree of separation was very subtle. 
But, most important, this paper has demonstrated that friction modelling can be used 
to replace both the Market Model and restricted least squares regression in event 
studies where there are two quantifiable variables and a number of possible 
interaction effects associated with the news that constitutes the study’s event. 
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